Attorney
Kennedy & Graven, Chartered
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) is one of the principal federal statutes prohibiting employment discrimination based on race, color, national origin, religion, and sex. In prior Title VII evaluations, courts, for decades, applied various verbal formulations on the severity of harm caused by alleged discrimination to determine violations. Whether the standard articulated by these courts was proper was the central focus of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, issued April 17, 2024, in which the court concluded Title VII’s bar on discrimination “with respect to . . . terms [or] conditions . . . of employment” does not require an employee to show that a job transfer caused a significant, serious, or substantial, disadvantage to the employee. Rather, to make out a Title VII discriminatory transfer claim, the employee must only show some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment because that is what the text of Title VII requires. The Muldrow decision has the potential to broaden the exposure of school districts to Title VII claims based on allegations of discriminatory employment transfers.
In Muldrow, Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow (“Muldrow”) sued the City of St. Louis (the “City”) under Title VII, alleging that she had suffered sex discrimination concerning the “terms [or] conditions” of her employment because the City allegedly transferred her from one job to another because she is a woman. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that Muldrow’s transfer was not an adverse employment action because Muldrow kept her rank and pay, and her dissatisfaction with new responsibilities did not amount to a material change. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri agreed with the City and granted it summary judgment. Considering Circuit precedent, the court explained that Muldrow needed to show her transfer affected a “significant” change in working conditions producing “material employment disadvantage.” The court found that Muldrow could not meet that heightened injury standard. In so finding, the court rejected Muldrow’s arguments that the transfer resulted in adverse action because the new job reduced her networking opportunities, regulated her to perform more administrative work, and altered her work schedule. The court reasoned that those changes appeared to be minor employment alterations, rather than material harm.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. It agreed that Muldrow had to—but could not—show that the transfer caused a “materially significant disadvantage.” Like the District Court, the Eighth Circuit emphasized that the transfer “did not result in a diminution to her title, salary, or benefits.” The Eighth Circuit, too, maintained that the changes to Muldrow’s job responsibilities were “insufficient” to amount to an adverse employment action and therefore did not support a Title VII claim.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether Muldrow was required to show a harm that was significant, serious, or something similar to maintain her discriminatory transfer claim under Title VII. The Court began its analysis by interpreting the text of Title VII, which prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against” individuals “with respect to” the “terms and conditions” of employment. Taking these terms together, the Court concluded that to maintain a Title VII claim, a transferee must satisfy two elements: (1) she must show the transfer—for example, a change in job responsibilities or job location—was based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; and (2) she must show some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that Title VII does not distinguish, as the courts below did, between transfers causing significant disadvantages and transfers causing not-so-significant ones. It further noted that demanding a heightened injury standard would impose a requirement on a Title VII claimant that the law, as written, did not intend.
After clarifying the proper standard of harm under Title VII, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Eighth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Muldrow has the potential to affect school districts in two key ways. First, following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, school district personnel alleging employment discrimination due to a job transfer need only demonstrate some harm to a term or condition of employment to maintain a Title VII claim. This lower standard could lead to more lawsuits alleging discriminatory transfers. Second, school districts may face increased scrutiny regarding the rationale behind employee transfers. Seemingly minor changes in duties, work environment, or scheduling could be viewed as potential disadvantages under Title VII. Accordingly, school districts should ensure transfer policies are objective and non-discriminatory, focusing on legitimate job-related reasons for transfers. School districts should also carefully document the rationale behind each employee transfer, explaining the job-related factors necessitating the move. Title VII administrators should also be offered training, particularly regarding avoiding discriminatory transfers and the legal standards following Muldrow. Moreover, school districts should be aware that while this case presented an issue under Title VII, this conclusion would apply to other principal federal statutes prohibiting discrimination—age, disability, etc.
This article is intended to provide general information with commentary. It should not be relied on as legal advice. If required, legal advice regarding this topic should be obtained from district legal counsel.
Alemayehu Z. Ditamo is an attorney with the law firm of Kennedy & Graven, Chartered. For more information, please contact him at (612) 337-9306 or aditamo@kennedy-graven.com.
© Alemayehu Z. Ditamo (2024). Used by permission.